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Abstract. Certificate Transparency (CT) requires that every CA-issued
TLS certificate must be publicly logged. While a CT log need not be
trusted in theory, it relies on the assumption that every client observes
and cryptographically verifies the same log. As such, some form of gossip
mechanism is needed in practice. Despite CT being adopted by several
major browser vendors, no gossip mechanism is widely deployed. We
suggest an aggregation-based gossip mechanism that passively observes
cryptographic material that CT logs emit in plaintext, aggregating at
packet processors (such as routers and switches) to periodically verify
log consistency off-path. In other words, gossip is provided as-a-service
by the network. Based on 20 days of RIPE Atlas measurements that
represent clients from 3500 autonomous systems and 40% of the IPv4
space, our proposal can be deployed incrementally for a realistic threat
model with significant protection against split-viewing CT logs. We also
show that aggregation-based gossip can be implemented for a variety of
packet processors using P4 and XDP, running at 10 Gbps line-speed.
1 Introduction
The HTTPS ecosystem is going through a paradigm shift. As opposed to blindly
trusting that Certificate Authorities (CAs) only issue certificates to the rightful
domain owners—a model known for its weakest-link security [19]—transparency
into the set of issued certificates is incrementally being required by major browser
vendors [1,36]. This transparency is forced and takes the form of Certificate
Transparency (CT) logs: the idea is to reject any TLS certificate that have
yet to be publicly logged, such that domain owners can monitor the logs for
client-accepted certificates to detect certificate mis-issuance after the fact [31].
While the requirement of certificate logging is a significant improvement to the
HTTPS ecosystem, the underlying problem of trusting CAs cannot be solved by
the status quo of trusted CT logs (Sect. 2.1). Therefore, it is paramount that
nobody needs to trust these logs once incremental deployments mature further.
CT is formalized and cryptographically verifiable [17], supporting inclusion
and consistency proofs. This means that a client can verify whether a log is
operated correctly: said certificates are included in the log, and nothing is being
removed or modified. Despite the ability to cryptographically verify these two
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properties, there are no assurances that everybody observes the same log [11,31].
For example, certificate mis-issuance would not be detected by a domain owner
that monitors the logs if fraudulently issued certificates are shown to the clients
selectively. A log that serves different versions of itself presents a split view [35].
Unless such log misbehaviour can be detected we must trust it not to happen.
The solution to the split viewing problem is a gossip mechanism which ensures
that everybody observes the same consistent log [31]. This assumption is simple
in theory but remarkably hard in practice due to client privacy, varying threat
models, and deployment challenges [35,42]. While Google started on a package
that supports minimal gossip [18] and the mechanisms of Nordberg et al. [35],
there is “next to no deployment in the wild” [22]. To this end we propose a
gossip mechanism that helps detecting split-view attacks retroactively based on
the idea of packet processors such as routers and middleboxes that aggregate
Signed Tree Heads (STHs)—succinct representations of the logs’ states—that
are exposed to the network in plaintext. The aggregated STHs are then used to
challenge the logs to prove consistency via an off-path, such that the logs cannot
distinguish between challenges that come from different aggregators. Given this
indistinguishability assumption it is non-trivial to serve a consistent split-view
to an unknown location [23]. Thus, all aggregators must be on the same view,
and accordingly all clients that are covered by these aggregators must also be on
the same view despite not doing any explicit gossip themselves because gossip is
provided as-a-service by the network. An isolated client (i.e., untrusted network
path to the aggregator) is notably beyond reach of any retroactive gossip [42].
The premise of having STHs in plaintext is controversial given current trends
to encrypt transport protocols, which is otherwise an approach that combats
inspection of network traffic and protocol ossification [20,27]. We argue that
keeping gossip related material in plaintext to support aggregation-based gossip
comes with few downsides though: it is easy to implement, there are no major
negative privacy impacts, and it would offer significant protection for a large
portion of the Internet with a realistic threat model despite relatively small
deployment efforts. The three main limitations are no protection against isolated
clients, reliance on clients that fetch STHs from the logs in plaintext, and possible
concerns surrounding protocol ossification [27]. Our contributions are as follows.
– Design and security considerations for a network-based gossip mechanism
that passively aggregates STHs to verify log consistency off-path (Sect. 3).
– Generic implementations of the aggregation step using P4 [6] and XDP [26]
for plaintext STHs, supporting line-speed packet processing on systems that
range from switches, routers, network interface cards, and Linux (Sect. 4).
– A simulation based on RIPE Atlas measurements that evaluate the impact
of deploying aggregation-based gossip at ASes and IXPs. Our evaluation
shows that incremental roll-out at well-connected locations would protect a
significant portion of all Internet clients from undetected split views (Sect. 5).
Besides the sections referenced above the paper first introduces necessary
background (Sect. 2) and finally provides discussion and conclusions (Sect. 6–8).
Appendices A–B provide further implementation and public data set details.
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2 Background
First additional prerequisites are provided on CT and the status quo, then the
techniques which allow us to program custom packet processors are introduced.
2.1 Certificate Transparency
The main motivation of CT is that the CA ecosystem is error-prone [29]: a CA
can normally issue certificates for any domain name, and given that there are
hundreds of trusted CAs an attacker only needs to target the weakest link [19].
While the requirement of CT logging all certificates cannot prevent mis-issuance
proactively, it allows anyone to detect it retroactively by monitoring the logs [31].
After a log promises to include a certificate by issuing a Signed Certificate Times-
tamp (SCT), a new STH including the appended certificate must be issued within
a Maximum Merge Delay (MMD). Typically, logs use 24 hour MMDs. Should
non-included SCTs and/or inconsistent STHs be found, binding evidence of log
misbehaviour exists because these statements are digitally signed. Other than
MMD a log’s policy defines parameters such as STH frequency: the number of
STHs that can be issued during an MMD, making it harder to track clients [35].
CT is being deployed across Apple’s platform [1] and Google’s Chrome [36].
The status quo is to trust a CA-signed certificate if it is accompanied by two
or more SCTs, thereby relying on at least one log to append each certificate
so that mis-issuance can be detected by monitors that inspect the logs. The
next step of this incremental deployment is to verify that these certificates are
actually logged by querying for inclusion [41], and that the log’s append-only
property is respected by challenging the log to prove STH consistency. Finally,
to fully distrust CT logs we need mechanisms that detect split-views. One such
mechanism which is based on programmable packet processors (introduced next)
is presented in Sect. 3, and it is compared to related work on CT gossip in Sect. 6.
2.2 Programmable Data Planes
Packet processors such as switches, routers, and network interface cards are
typically integrated tightly using customized hardware and application-specific
integrated circuits. This inflexible design limits the potential for innovation
and leads to long product upgrade cycles, where it takes years to introduce
new processing capabilities and support for different protocols and header fields
(mostly following lengthy standardization cycles). The recent shift towards flex-
ible match+action packet-processing pipelines—including RMT [7], Intel Flex-
pipe1, Cavium XPA2, and Barefoot Tofino3—now have the potential to change
1 https://www.intel.com/content/dam/www/public/us/en/documents/product-
briefs/ethernet-switch-fm6000-series-brief.pdf (n.d.)
2 https://web.archive.org/web/20170707175037/https://cavium.com/
newsevents-cavium-and-xpliant-introduce-a-fully-programmable-switch-
silicon-family.html (n.d.)
3 https://web.archive.org/web/20180105002028/https://barefootnetworks.com/
products/brief-tofino/ (n.d.)
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the way in which packet processing hardware is implemented: it enables pro-
grammability using high-level languages such as P4 (see below), while at the
same time maintaining performance comparable to fixed-function chips.
P4. The main goal of P4 is to simplify programming of protocol-independent
packet processors by providing an abstract programming model for the network
data plane [6]. In this setting the functionality of a packet processing device is
specified without assuming any hardwired protocols and headers. Consequently,
a P4 program must parse headers and connect the values of those protocol fields
to the actions that should be executed based on a pipeline of reconfigurable
match+action tables. Based on the specified P4 code, a front-end compiler gen-
erates a high-level intermediate representation that a back-end compiler uses
to create a target-dependent program representation. Compilers are available
for several platforms, including the software-based simple switch architecture4,
SDNet for Xilinx NetFPGA boards [9], and Netronome’s smart network inter-
faces [38]. It is also possible to compile basic P4 programs into eBPF byte code.5
XDP. The Berkeley Packet Filter (BPF) is a Linux-based packet filtering mech-
anism [33]. Verified bytecode is injected from user space, and executed for each
received packet in kernel space by a just-in-time compiler. Extended BPF (eBPF)
enhances the original BPF concept, enabling faster runtime and many new fea-
tures.6 For example, an eBPF program can be attached to the Linux traffic
control tool tc, and additional hooks were defined for a faster eXpress Data
Path (XDP) [26]. In contrast to the Intel Data Plane Development Kit (DPDK)
which runs in user space and completely controls a given network interface that
supports a DPDK driver,7 XDP cooperates with the Linux stack to achieve fast,
programmable, and reconfigurable packet processing using C-like programs.
3 Design
An overview of aggregation-based gossip is shown in Fig. 1. The setting consists
of logs that send plaintext STHs to clients over a network, and as part of the
network inline packet processors passively aggregate observed STHs to their own
off-path challengers which challenge the logs to prove consistency. A log cannot
present split views to different clients that share an aggregating vantage point
because it would trivially be detected by that vantage point’s challenger. A log
also cannot present a persistent split view to different challengers because they
are off-path in the sense that they are indistinguishable from one another. This
means that every client that is covered by an aggregator must be on the same
4 https://github.com/p4lang/p4c-bm (2018)
5 https://github.com/iovisor/bcc/tree/master/src/cc/frontends/p4 (2018)
6 https://github.com/netoptimizer/prototype-kernel/blob/master/kernel/
Documentation/bpf/index.rst (2017)
7 https://web.archive.org/web/20180520162550/https://dpdk.org/ (n.d.)
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Fig. 1: Packet processor that aggregates plaintext STHs for off-path verification.
view because at least one challenger will otherwise detect an inconsistency and
report it. A client that is not directly covered by an aggregator may receive
indirect protection in the form of herd immunity. This is discussed in Sect. 7.4.
3.1 Threat Model and Security Notion
The overarching threat is undetectable domain impersonation (ex-post) by an
attacker that is capable of compromising at least one CA and a sufficient number
of CT logs to convince a client into accepting a forged certificate. We assume that
any illegitimately issued certificate would be detected by the legitimate domain
owner through self or delegated third-party monitoring. This means that an
attacker must either provide a split view towards the victim or the monitoring
entity. We also assume that clients query the logs for certificate inclusion based
on STHs that it acquires from the logs via plaintext mechanisms that packet
processors can observe, and that some other entities than challengers process
STHs using the chosen off-paths (Sect 7.1). We do not account for the fact that
CA compromises may be detected by other means, focusing solely on split views.
Limitations. Our gossip mechanism is limited to STHs that packet processors
can observe. As such, a client isolated by an attacker is not protected. We limit
ourselves to attackers that act over a network some distance (in the sense of
network path length) from a client in plaintext so that aggregation can take
place. Our limitations and assumptions are further discussed in Sect. 7.1.
Attackers. Exceptionally powerful attackers can isolate clients, but clients are
not necessarily easy to isolate for a significant number of relevant attackers. Isola-
tion may require physical control over a device,8 clients may be using anonymity
networks like Tor where path selection is inherently unpredictable [16], or suf-
ficiently large parts of the network cannot be controlled to ensure that no ag-
gregation takes place. This may be the case if we consider a nation state actor
8 See FBI-Apple San Bernardino case: https://web.archive.org/web/
20180520135200/https://www.eff.org/cases/apple-challenges-fbi-all-
writs-act-order (2016)
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attacking another nation state actor, the prevalence of edge security middle-
boxes, and that home routers or NICs nearby the clients could aggregate. Any
attacker that cannot account for these considerations is within our threat model.
Security Notion. To bypass our approach towards gossip an adaptive attacker
may attempt to actively probe the network for aggregating packet processors.
This leads us to the key security notion: aggregation indistinguishability. An
attacker should not be able to determine if a packet processor is aggregating
STHs. The importance of aggregation indistinguishability motivates the design of
our gossip mechanism into two distinct components: aggregation that takes place
inline at packet processors, and periodic off-path log challenging that checks
whether the observed STHs are consistent (if not report the misbehaving log).
3.2 Packet Processor Aggregation
An aggregating packet-processor determines for each packet if it is STH-related.
If so, the packet is cloned and sent to a challenging component for off-path
verification (see Sect. 3.3). The exact definition of STH-related depends on the
plaintext source, but it is ultimately the process of inspecting multiple packet
headers such as transport protocol and port number. It should be noted that the
original packet must not be dropped or modified. For example, an aggregator
would have a trivial aggregation distinguisher if it dropped any malformed STH.
For each aggregating packet processor we have to take IP fragmentation
into consideration. Recall that IP fragmentation usually occurs when a packet
is larger than the MTU, splitting it into multiple smaller IP packets that are
reassembled at the destination host. Normally an STH should not be frag-
mented because it is much smaller than the de-facto minimum MTU of (at least)
576 bytes [8,14], but an attacker could use fragmentation to intentionally spread
expected headers across multiple packets. Assuming stateless packet processing,
an aggregator cannot identify such fragmented packets as STH-related because
some header would be absent (cf. stateless firewalls). All tiny fragments should
therefore be aggregated to account for intentional IP fragmentation, which ap-
pears to have little or no impact on normal traffic because tiny fragments are
anomalies [40]. The threat of multi-path fragmentation is discussed in Sect. 7.1.
Large traffic loads must also be taken into account. If an aggregating packet
processor degrades in performance as the portion of STH-related traffic increases,
a distant attacker may probe for such behaviour to determine if a path contains
an aggregator. Each implementation must therefore be evaluated individually
for such behaviour, and if trivial aggregation distinguishers exist this needs to
be solved. For example, STH-related traffic could be aggregated probabilistically
to reduce the amount of work (Appendix A.2). Another option is to load-balance
the traffic before aggregation, i.e., avoid worst-case loads that cannot be handled.
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3.3 Off-Path Log Challenging
A challenger is setup to listen for aggregated traffic, reassembling IP fragments
and storing the aggregated STHs for periodic off-path verification. Periodic
off-path verification means that the challenger challenges the log based on its
own (off-path fetched) STHs and the observed (aggregated) STHs to verify log
consistency periodically, e.g., every day. The definition of off-path is that the
challenger must not be linkable to its aggregating packet processor(s) or any
other challenger (including itself). Without an off-path there is no gossip step
amongst aggregator-challenger instances that are operated by different actors,
and our approach towards gossip would only assert that clients behind the same
vantage point observe the same logs. If a log cannot distinguish between different
challengers due to the use of off-paths, however, it is non-trivial to maintain a
targeted split-view towards an unknown location. Therefore, we get a form of
implicit gossip [23] because at least one challenger would detect an inconsistency
unless everybody observes the same log. If every challenger observes the same log,
so does every client that is covered by an aggregating packet processor. Notably
the challenger component does not run inline to avoid timing distinguishers.
Sect. 7.1 discusses aggregation distinguishers based on unique STH probes.
4 Implementation and Distinguishability Experiments
There are many different ways to implement the aggregation step. We decided
to use P4 and XDP because a large variety of programmable packet processors
support these languages (Sect 2.2). The aggregated plaintext source is assumed
to be CT-over-DNS [30], which means that a client obtains STHs by fetching IN
TXT resource records. Since languages for programmable packet processors are
somewhat restricted, we facilitated packet processing by requiring that at most
one STH is sent per UDP packet (Appendix A.1). This is reasonable because
logs should only have one most recent STH. A DNS STH is roughly 170 bytes
without any packet headers and should normally not be fragmented, but to
ensure that we do not miss any intentionally fragmented STHs we aggregate
every tiny fragment. We did not implement the challenging component because
it is relatively easy given an existing off-path. Should any scalability issue arise
for the challenger there is nothing that prevents a distributed front-end that
processes the aggregated material before storage. Storage is not an issue because
there are only a limited amount of unique STHs per day and log (one new STH
per hour is a common policy, and browsers recognize ≈ 40 logs). Further details
can be found on GitHub (https://github.com/rgdd/ctga) and in Appendix A.
Setup. We used a test-bed consisting of a traffic generator, a traffic receiver,
and an aggregating target in between. The first target is a P4-enabled NetFPGA
SUME board that runs an adapted version of our P4 reference implementation.
The second target is a net-next kernel v4.17.0-rc6 Linux machine that runs XDP
on one core with a 10 Gb SFP+ X520 82599ES Intel card, a 3.6 GHz Intel Core
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i7-4790 CPU, and 16 GB of RAM at 1600 MHz (Hynix/Hyundai). We would like
to determine whether there are any aggregation distinguishers as the fraction of
STHs (experiment 1) and tiny fragments (experiment 2) in the traffic is increased
from 0–100%, i.e., does performance degrade as a function of STH-related rate?
Non-fragmented STH packets are 411 bytes,9 and tiny fragments are 64 bytes.
All background traffic have the same packet sizes but is not deemed STH-related.
Results. Fig. 2a shows throughput as a function of STH-related rate for the
P4-enabled NetFPGA. While we were unable to observe any distinguisher be-
tween normal routing and the edge case of 100% aggregation for non-fragmented
STH packets, there is a small constant throughput difference for tiny fragments
(7.5 Kbps). This is a non-negligible program distinguisher if a packet processor
is physically isolated as in our benchmark, i.e., something other than a routing
program is running but it is not necessarily an aggregator because performance
does not degrade as a function of increased STH-related rate. However, we found
such degradation behaviour for the single-core XDP case (Fig. 2b). If line-speed
is higher than 2 Gbps, traffic could be load-balanced to overcome this issue.
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Fig. 2: Throughput as a function of STH-related traffic that is aggregated.
Lessons learned. Aggregation indistinguishability is provided by P4-NetFPGA.
For XDP it depends on the scenario: what is the line-rate criteria and how many
cores are available. Five cores support 10 Gbps aggregation indistinguishability.
5 Estimated Impact of Deployment
We conducted 20 daily traceroute measurements during spring 2018 on the RIPE
Atlas platform to evaluate the effectiveness of aggregation-based gossip. The
9 We used excessively large DNS headers to maximize the packet parsing overhead.
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basic idea is to look at client coverage as central ASes and IXPs aggregate
STHs. If any significant client coverage can be achieved, the likelihood of pulling
off an undetected split-view will be small given aggregation indistinguishability.
Setup. We scheduled RIPE Atlas measurements from roughly 3500 unique ASes
that represent 40% of the IPv4 space, trace-routing Google’s authoritative CT-
over-DNS server and NORDUnet’s CT log to simulate clients that fetch DNS
STHs in plaintext (Appendix B.1). Each traceroute result is a list of traversed
IPs, and it can be translated into the corresponding ASes and IXPs using public
data sets (Appendix B.2). In other words, traversed ASes and IXPs can be
determined for each probe. Since we are interested in client coverage as ASes
and IXPs aggregate, each probe is weighted by the IPv4 space of its AS. While
an IP address is an imperfect representation of a client, e.g., an IP may be unused
or reused, it gives a decent idea of how significant it is to cover a given probe.
Results. Fig. 3 shows AS/IXP path length and stability from the probes to
the targets. If the AS path length is one, a single AS is traversed before reaching
the target. It is evident that an AS path tends to be one hop longer towards
NORDUnet than Google because there is a rough off-by-one offset on the x-axis.
A similar trend of greater path length towards NORDUnet can be observed for
IXPs. For example, 74.0% of all paths traversed no IXP towards Google, but
58.5% of all paths traversed a single IXP towards NORDUnet. These results
can be explained by infrastructural differences of our targets: since Google is a
worldwide actor an average path should be shorter than compared to a region-
restricted actor like NORDUnet. We also observed that AS and IXP paths tend
to be quite stable over 20 days (the duration of our measurements). In other
words, if AS a and b are traversed it is unlikely to suddenly be routed via AS c.
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Fig. 3: Path length and stability towards Google and NORDUnet.
Fig. 4 shows coverage of the RIPE Atlas network as 1...n actors aggregate
STHs. For example, 100% and 50% coverage means that at least 40% and 20%
of the full IPv4 space is covered. The aggregating ASes and IXPs were selected
based on the most commonly traversed vantage points in our measurements
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Fig. 4: Coverage as a function of aggregation opt-in.
(Pop), as well as CAIDA’s largest AS ranking.10 We found that more coverage
is achieved when targeting NORDUnet than Google. This is expected given that
the paths tend to be longer. Further, if CAIDA’s top-32 enabled aggregation the
coverage would be significant towards Google (31.6%) and NORDUnet (58.1%).
Lessons learned. A vast majority of all clients traverse at least one AS that
could aggregate. It is relatively rare to traverse IXPs towards Google but not
NORDUnet. We also learned that paths tends to be stable, which means that the
time until split view detection would be at least 20 days if it is possible to find an
unprotected client. This increases the importance of aggregation indistinguisha-
bility. Finally, we identified vantage points that are commonly traversed using
Pop, and these vantage points are represented well by CAIDA’s independent AS
ranking. Little opt-in from ASes and IXPs provides significant coverage against
an attacker that is relatively close to a client (cf. world-wide infrastructure of
Google). Although we got better coverage for NORDUnet, any weak attacker
would approach Google’s coverage by renting infrastructure nearby. Any weak
attacker could also circumvent IXP aggregation by detecting the IXP itself. As
such, aggregating at top-ranked ASes should give the best split-view protection.
6 Related Work
Earlier approaches towards CT gossip are categorized as proactive or retroactive
in Fig. 5. We consider an approach proactive if gossip takes place before SCTs
and/or STHs reach the broader audience of clients. Syta et al. proposed proactive
witness cosigning, in which an STH is collectively signed by a large number of
witnesses and at most a fraction of those can be faulty to ensure that a benevolent
witness observed an STH [42]. STH cross-logging [18,24,25] is similar in that an
STH must be proactively disclosed in another transparency log to be trusted,
avoiding any additional cosigning infrastructure at the cost of reducing the size
and diversity of the witnessing group. Tomescu and Devadas [43] suggested a
similar cross-logging scheme, but split-view detection is instead reduced to the
10 CAIDA ranks ASes based on collected topological data sets (Appendix B.2).
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RetroactiveProactiveSTH cross-logging [18,24,25,43]
STH pushing [41]
STH cosigning [42]
Implicit via multipath [23]
STH pooling [11,35]
Trusted auditing [35]
SCT feedback [35]
CT honey bee [3]
Fig. 5: A categorization of approaches towards CT gossip.
difficulty of forking the Bitcoin blockchain (big-O cost of downloading all block
headers as a TLS client). The final proactive approach is STH pushing, where a
trusted third-party pushes the same verified STH history to a base of clients [41].
We consider a gossip mechanism retroactive if gossip takes place after SCTs
and/or STHs reach the broader audience of clients. Chuat et al. proposed that
TLS clients and TLS servers be modified to pool exchanged STHs and relevant
consistency proofs [11]. Nordberg et al. continued this line of work, suggesting
privacy-preserving client-server pollination of fresh STHs [35]. Nordberg et al.
also proposed that clients feedback SCTs and certificate chains on every server
revisit, and that trusted auditor relationships could be engaged if privacy need
not be protected. The latter is somewhat similar to the formalized client-monitor
gossip of Chase and Meiklejohn [10], as well as the CT honey bee project where
a client process fetches and submits STHs to a pre-compiled list of auditors [3].
Laurie suggested that a client can resolve privacy-sensitive SCTs to privacy-
insensitive STHs via DNS (which are easier to gossip) [30]. Private information
retrievals could likely achieve something similar [32]. Assuming that TLS clients
are indistinguishable from one another, split-view detection could also be implicit
as proposed by Gunn et al. for the verifiable key-value store CONIKS [23,34].
Given that aggregation-based gossip takes place after an STH is issued, it
is a retroactive approach. As such, we cannot protect an isolated client from
split-views [42]. Similar to STH pooling and STH pollination, we rely on client-
driven communication and an existing infrastructure of packet processors to
aggregate. Our off-path verification is based on the same multi-path probing
and indistinguishability assumptions as Gunn et al. [2,23,44]. Further, given
that aggregation is application neutral and deployable on hosts, it could provide
gossip for the CT honey bee project (assuming plaintext STHs) and any other
transparency application like Trillian [21]. Another benefit when compared to
browsing-centric and vendor-specific approaches is that a plethora of HTTPS
clients are covered, ranging from niche web browsers to command line tools and
embedded libraries that are vital to protect but yet lack the resources of major
browser vendors [4,15]. Our approach coexists well with witness cosigning and
cross-logging due to different threat models, but not necessarily STH pushing if
the secure channel is encrypted (no need to fetch what a trusted party provides).
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7 Discussion
Below we discuss assumptions, limitations, and deployment, showing that our
approach towards retroactive gossip can be deployed at scale to detect split-views
by many relevant attackers with relatively little effort. The main drawback is
reliance on clients fetching STHs in plaintext, e.g., using CT-over-DNS [30].
7.1 Assumptions and Limitations
Aggregation-based gossip is limited to network traffic that packet processors
can observe. The strongest type of attacker in this setting—who can completely
isolate a client—trivially defeats our gossip mechanism and other retroactive
approaches in the literature (see Sect. 6). A weaker attacker cannot isolate a
client, but is located nearby in a network path length sense. This limits the
opportunity for packet processor aggregation, but an attacker cannot rule it
out given aggregation indistinguishability. Sect. 4 showed based on performance
that it is non-trivial to distinguish between (non-)aggregating packet processors
on two different targets using P4 and XDP. Off-path challengers must also be
indistinguishable from one another to achieve implicit gossip. While we suggested
the use of anonymity networks like Tor, a prerequisite is that this is in and of
itself not an aggregation distinguisher.11 Therefore, we assume that other entities
also use off-paths to fetch and verify STHs. The fact that a unique STH is not
audited from an off-path could also be an aggregation distinguisher. To avoid
this we could rely on a verifiable STH history12 and wait until the next MMD to
audit or simply monitor the full log so that consistency proofs are unnecessary.
The existence of multiple network paths are fundamental to the structure
and functioning of the Internet. A weak attacker may use IP fragmentation such
that each individual STH fragment is injected from a different location to make
aggregation harder, approaching the capabilities of a stronger attacker that is
located closer to the client. This is further exacerbated by the deployment of
multi-path transport protocols like MPTCP (which can also be fragmented).
Looking back at our RIPE Atlas measurements in Sect. 5, the results towards
Google’s world-wide infrastructure better represent an active attacker that takes
some measures to circumvent aggregation by approaching a client nearby the
edge. Given that the likelihood of aggregation is high if any IXP is present
(Fig. 4), aggregation at well-connected IXPs are most likely to be circumvented.
7.2 Deployment
Besides aggregating at strategic locations in the Internet’s backbone, ISPs and
enterprise networks have the opportunity to protect all of their clients with
11 Low-latency anonymity networks like Tor are susceptible to traffic confirmation and
correlation attacks where the attacker observes traffic from the packet processor and
is in control of the response from the CT logs. A strictly isolated packet processor
may not be able to hide that it is challenging the logs (i.e., aggregation distinguisher).
12 https://web.archive.org/web/20170806160119/https://mailarchive.ietf.org/
arch/msg/trans/JbFiwO90PjcYzXrEgh-Y7bFG5Fw (2017)
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relatively little effort. Deployment of special-purpose middleboxes are already
prevalent in these environments, and then the inconvenience of fragmentation
tends to go away due to features such as packet reassembly. Further, an attacker
cannot trivially circumvent the edge of a network topology—especially not if
aggregation takes place on an end-system: all fragments are needed to reassemble
a packet, which means that multi-path fragmentation is no longer a threat. If
aggregation-based gossip is deployed on an end-system, STHs could be hooked
using other approaches than P4/XDP. For example, shim-layers that intercept
TLS certificates higher up in the networking stack were already proposed by
Bates et al. [5] and O’Neill et al. [37]. In this setting an end-system is viewed as
the aggregating packet processor, and it reports back to an off-path challenger
that may be a local process running on the same system or a remote entity, e.g.,
a TelCo could host challengers that collect aggregated STHs from smartphones.
While we looked at programming physical packet processors like routers,
STH aggregation could be approached in hypervisors and software switches [39]
to protect many virtual hosts. If CT-over-DNS is used to fetch STHs, it would be
promising to output DNS server caches to implement the aggregation step. Sim-
ilar to DNS servers, so called Tor exist relays also operate DNS caches. In other
words, P4 and XDP are only examples of how to instantiate the aggregation step.
Depending on the used plaintext source, packet processor, and network topology
other approaches may be more suitable, e.g., C for vendor-specific middleboxes.
7.3 Retroactive Gossip Benefits From Plaintext
As opposed to an Internet core that only forwards IP packets, extra functionality
is often embedded which causes complex processing dependencies and protocol
ossification [27]. Many security and protocol issues were found for middleboxes
that provides extra functionality [20,28], resulting in the mindset that everything
should be encrypted [28]. Our work is controversial because it goes against this
mindset and advocates that STHs should be communicated in plaintext. We
argue that this makes sense in the context of STHs due to the absence of privacy
concerns and because the entire point of gossip is to make STHs available (rather
than end-to-end only). The idea of intentionally exposing information to the
network is not new, e.g., MPQUIC is designed to support traffic shaping [12].
While we used CT-over-DNS as a plaintext source, there is a push towards
DNS-over-TLS13 and DNS-over-HTTPS14. Wide use of these approaches could
undermine our gossip mechanism, but ironically the security of TLS could be
jeopardized unless gossip is deployed. In other words, long term gossip is an
essential component of CT and other transparency logs to avoid becoming yet
another class of trusted third-parties. If proactive approaches such as witness
13 https://web.archive.org/web/20180422194047/https://
security.googleblog.com/2018/04/dns-over-tls-support-in-android-p.html
(2018)
14 https://web.archive.org/web/20180512125541/https://blog.cloudflare.com/
dns-resolver-1-1-1-1/ (2018)
14 R. Dahlberg et al.
cosigning are rejected in favour of retroactive mechanisms, then ensuring that
STHs are widely spread and easily accessible is vital. An STH needs no secrecy
if the appropriate measures are taken to make it privacy-insensitive [35]. While
secure channels also provide integrity and replay protection, an STH is already
signed by logs and freshness is covered by MMDs as well as issue frequency to
protect privacy. A valid argument against exposing any plaintext to the network
is protocol ossification. We emphasize that our design motivates why packet
processors should fail open: otherwise there is no aggregation indistinguishability.
7.4 Indistinguishability and Herd Immunity
An attacker that gains control over a CT log is bound to be more risk averse
than an attacker that compromises a CA. There is an order of magnitude fewer
logs than CAs, and client vendors are likely going to be exceptionally picky when
it comes to accepted and rejected logs. We have already seen examples of this,
including Google Chrome disqualifying logs that made mistakes: Izenpe used the
same key for production and testing,15 and Venafi suffered from an unfortunate
power outage.16 Risk averse attackers combined with packet processors that are
aggregation indistinguishable may lead to herd immunity : despite a significant
fraction of clients that lack aggregators, indirect protection may be provided
because the risk of eventual detection is unacceptable to many attackers. Hof
and Carle [25] and Nordberg et al. [35] discussed herd immunity briefly before us.
8 Conclusion
Wide spread modifications of TLS clients are soon inevitable to support CT
gossip. We proposed that these modifications include challenging the logs to
prove certificate inclusion based on STHs fetched in plaintext, thereby enabling
the traversed packet processors to assist in split view detection retroactively by
aggregating STHs for periodic off-path verification. Beyond being an application
neutral approach that is complementary to proactive gossip, a compelling aspect
is that core packet processors are used (rather than clients) as a key building
block to realize implicit gossip; should a consistency issue arise, it is already in
the hands of an entity that is well equipped to investigate the cause manually.
Considering that far from all TLS clients are backed by big browser vendors—not
to mention other use-cases of transparency logs in general—it is likely a long-
term win to avoid pushing complex retroactive gossip logic into all the different
types of clients when there are orders of magnitudes fewer packet processors
that could aggregate to their own off-path challengers. While taking the risk
of ossification into account by suggesting that packet processors fail open to
provide aggregation indistinguishability, our approach offers rapid incremental
deployment with high impact on a significant fraction of Internet users.
15 https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/forum/#!topic/ct-policy/
qOorKuhL1vA (2016)
16 https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/forum/#!topic/ct-policy/
KMAcNT3asTQ (2017)
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A Implementation
Below implementation details are provided for CT-over-DNS as the aggregated
plaintext source. However, most of the discussion is not only relevant for DNS.
A.1 Plaintext Source
Aggregation-based gossip relies on a plaintext source that packet processors can
observe. The most applicable mechanism today is CT-over-DNS, which is hosted
by Google for all Chrome-included logs. According to the draft by Laurie [30],
a DNS STH response is an IN TXT resource record where the query domain
is sth.<log>.ct.googleapis.com. We further restrict the format such that a
response must be transported by UDP and contain (i) a single query, (ii) a single
response, and (iii) no more than a threshold of bytes. It is hard to process a TCP
data stream because it may span multiple IP packets.17 At best, it is also hard
to parse variable-length and human-readable protocols such as HTTP.18 From a
general standpoint, this means that neither TLS≤ 1.2 nor OCSP are particularly
prominent sources to aggregate despite STHs being transferred in plaintext [13].
A.2 Proof-of-Concept
Figure 6 gives an overview of the headers that must be declared, parsed, and
inspected to aggregate DNS STHs. It is relatively easy to extract headers down to
DNS, after which the processing must continue in multiple stages: extract a fixed-
width preamble that contains the number of questions (qd) and answers (an),
loop to extract the query domain name, and finally extract the fixed remainder
of the query (type and class). It is not possible to parse an arbitrary number
of questions and answers in P4/XDP because loops must be constantly bound.
This motivates the somewhat restricted CT-over-DNS format in Appendix A.1.
If all conditions in Figure 6 hold for a packet, it is cloned in addition to nor-
mal routing using an existing P4-action or by control-plane copying via XDP’s
ring-buffer19. Note that small IP fragments which are less than a threshold are
also marked for cloning, accounting for attackers that intentionally fragment
IP packets to bypass aggregation. Finally, our proof-of-concepts support simple
probabilistic filtering by cloning every nth match for a security parameter n.
17 https://web.archive.org/web/20180107232830/http://lists.p4.org/pipermail/
p4-dev lists.p4.org/2017-July/001176.html (2017)
18 http://web.archive.org/web/20190406091829/http://lists.p4.org/pipermail/
p4-dev lists.p4.org/2017-July/001175.html (2017)
19 https://github.com/cilium/cilium/blob/master/Documentation/bpf.rst (2018)
18 R. Dahlberg et al.
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Fig. 6: Criteria to aggregate an incoming packet pkt in.
A.3 Caveats
Aggregation indistinguishability. Our packet processing is designed to avoid
trivial aggregation distinguishers, such as dropping tiny fragments proactively
because they are more cumbersome to validate (e.g., it requires reassembly).
Accordingly, it is paramount that developers ensure that malformed packets are
not dropped on parser exceptions and that STH-related traffic remains unmod-
ified by failing open. Given that typical programs often operate on lower-layer
headers, this is particularly important while processing UDP and DNS headers.
IP fragments and options. To minimize data collection an IP fragment should
only be aggregated if it is less than a threshold. Therefore, a log client must re-
ject STH packets that are too large. At the time of writing a typical DNS STH
is encoded as ≈170 bytes, and a 400 byte threshold would presumably be large
enough to account for IP options, large domain names, and STH extensions
(should they exists in the future). The privacy impact of aggregating small frag-
ments appears to have little or no impact on legitimate traffic [40],20 which is
reasonable given that the de-facto minimum MTU has been at least 576 bytes
for decades [8,14]. In other words, small fragments are anomalies rather than
expected behaviour. Under normal circumstances and a sound STH frequency
for privacy, we expect around 24 unique STHs per day and log to be aggregated.
B Data Sets
Our traceroute data set is publicly available and described in Appendix B.1. The
role of other public data sets used in our analysis are explained in Appendix B.2.
B.1 RIPE Atlas Traceroute Measurements
Our traceroute measurements can be downloaded from the RIPE Atlas platform.
Identifiers: 11603880–11603884, 11784033–11784042, and 11826645–11826649.
20 https://web.archive.org/web/20180612113649/https://tools.cisco.com/
security/center/viewIpsSignature.x?signatureId=1206& (2006)
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Probe selection. The goal of our probe selection process was to maximize the
number of unique ASes (which will represent blocks of IP addresses that we can
evaluate coverage for). The scope of our search was reduced to IPv4 because
many probes support it, and for redundancy the two most stable probes in each
unique AS were selected. We based the stable criteria on the RIPE Atlas tag
system-ipv4-stable-n, such that a probe got the highest priority if n=90 days.
While many ASes had too few probes to support redundancy, we ended up
requesting 4604 probes. After removing the redundant probes that delivered
the fewest amount of traceroute results, there were little or no failures amongst
the remaining 3512 (Google) and 3488 (NORDUnet) probes: around 100 probes
failed at least once, and among those 24 as well as 17 probes (respectively) failed
more than once. This means that the reliability of RIPE Atlas platform is high,
and thus it is unnecessary to account for failures while analyzing our results.
Duration and measurement settings. For all probes we scheduled a daily
traceroute towards Google and NORDUnet. Our measurements towards Google
started on March 10 2018 and ended on March 30 2018. On March 20 we started
another measurement towards NORDUnet that ended on April 9 2018. We used
the RIPE Atlas default traceroute settings: ICMP port 80 with default spread
and Paris traceroute enabled21 (value 16). The response timeout was set to
4000 ms for three 48 byte packets and 32 max hops. We also hard-coded the
targeted IP addresses because not all probes support DNS lookups. To verify that
the mapping from domain name to IP address remained the same for Google’s
authoritative CT-over-DNS server, we conducted a daily santiy-check22 from 128
worldwide probes that resolved ctns.googleapis.com ≡ 216.239.34.64 on the
probes. An employee at SUNET verified that plausible-fe1.ct.nordu.net ≡
194.68.13.48 would remain stable throughout the course of our experiments.
B.2 Public Data Sets
The traceroute data set in Appendix B.1 contains lists of IP addresses. Since we
are interested in the actors that control the corresponding packet processors, i.e.,
which actors are on a given path, we mapped each IP address to an AS number
and/or IXP identifier using public data sets from Routeviews23 and CAIDA24.
We also relied on RIPE Atlas probe metadata to map probes to AS numbers,25
21 https://web.archive.org/web/20180511201452/https://paris-traceroute.net/
(n.d.)
22 RIPE Atlas measurement identifiers: 11603871 and 11793938.
23 The Routeviews MRT format RIBs and UPDATEs Dataset, 2018-03-12 14:00, http:
//archive.routeviews.org/bgpdata/2018.03/RIBS/
24 The CAIDA UCSD IXPs Dataset, February 2018, https://www.caida.org/data/
ixps/
25 https://atlas.ripe.net/docs/api/v2/reference/#!/probes/probe list get, ac-
cessed REST API 2018-04-06
20 R. Dahlberg et al.
CAIDA’s largest AS rank to select globally influential ASes as aggregators,26
and Routeviews’ data set to annotate each probe with the IPv4 space of its AS.
26 http://as-rank.caida.org/api/v1, accessed REST API 2018-04-06
